The Evolution of Medical Peer Review in North Dakota by Sagsveen, Murray G. & Thompson, Jennifer L.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 73 Number 3 Article 3 
1997 
The Evolution of Medical Peer Review in North Dakota 
Murray G. Sagsveen 
Jennifer L. Thompson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sagsveen, Murray G. and Thompson, Jennifer L. (1997) "The Evolution of Medical Peer Review in North 
Dakota," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 73 : No. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol73/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICAL PEER REVIEW
IN NORTH DAKOTA
MURRAY G. SAGSVEEN* AND JENNIFER L. THOMPSON"
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent state court decisions and legislation have substantially
impacted effective medical peer review in North Dakota. This article will
explain the importance of peer review, summarize the judicial decisions
which triggered recent state legislation, and analyze the state legislation
which re-established an effective peer review process in North Dakota.
II. MEDICAL PEER REVIEW
Medical peer review is a process in which practicing physicians
evaluate the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of the performance of
other physicians and health care professionals.' In the mid-1980s, Con-
gress established federal guidelines for effective medical peer review as a
response to the increasing problem of medical malpractice. 2 The intent
of medical peer review is to reduce the number of occurrences of
medical malpractice and improve the quality of health care by using
practicing physicians to identify and discipline incompetent or unpro-
fessional physicians.3 Medical peer review committees, usually consist-
ing of an impartial hearing officer and practicing physicians who are not
in direct economic competition with the physician being reviewed, con-
duct the peer review. 4 The rationale for using practicing physicians to
conduct peer review is that they are able to observe each other on a
* Murray G. Sagsveen is the general counsel for the North Dakota Medical Association and a
partner in the Zuger, Kirmis & Smith law firm, Bismarck, North Dakota.
** Jennifer L. Thompson is a 1997 graduate of the University of North Dakota School of Law.
1. Robert S. Adler, Stalking The Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 696 (Winter, 1991); see also Clark C. Havighurst, Professional
Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36 CASE W. R Es. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (1986) (defining professional
peer review as fellow physicians overseeing practices of individual physicians for purposes of
maintaining quality and containing cost of medical care); William G. Kopit, Commentary: Professional
Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1170, 1172 (1986) (defining professional
peer review as the process whereby a hospital establishes standards for appropriate quality of care
and then the medical staff judges individual physicians for compliance with standards).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1 i101(1) (1995).
3. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 6384 (codified at 42
U.S.C § 11101 (1994)).
4. Id. at 6393 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11101). However, finding hearing officers and physicians
who are not in direct economic competition with the physician being reviewed may be difficult in rural
areas or in situations involving highly specialized medicine. Id. Furthermore, it may not be feasible to
find physicians who are of the same specialty as the reviewed physician but who are not in direct
economic competition. Id.
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regular basis and they also have the expertise to evaluate the quality of
each other's work. 5
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PEER REVIEW AND THE HEALTH
CARE QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1986
In 1952, the American College of Surgeons, the American Medical
Association, the American Hospital Association, and the American Col-
lege of Physicians joined in an effort to improve the standard of care in
hospitals and established the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals, now referred to as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Health Care Organizations (JCAHO).6 The purpose of forming the
JCAHO was, and continues to be, to establish hospital accreditation
standards. 7 Under JCAHO accreditation standards, hospital medical
staffs8 are responsible for establishing peer review guidelines, which
require uniform criteria for evaluating persons applying for medical
staff jobs and for current medical staff members.9
Until 1986, state legislation exclusively governed peer review. 10
However, in November 1986, Congress enacted the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act (HCQIA) which established federal guidelines for
effective peer review.11 These peer review guidelines were established
after congressional findings revealed that the increase in medical mal-
practice and the need for quality health care were national problems that
individual states could not remedy.' 2 Thus, the goal of the HCQIA was
to improve the quality of health care nation wide using peer review to
identify and discipline incompetent or unprofessional physicians. 13
5. See Adler, supra note 1.
6. James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer Review, 51 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7, 10 (Spring, 1988); see also JOINT COMMISSION ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATIONS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1995).
7. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 6, at 10. Although not all states require their hospitals to be
JCAHO accredited, the JCAHO is considered the foremost authority in establishing the standards for
hospital accreditation in the United States. Id. It is completely voluntary for states to participate in the
JCAHO accreditation program, however, many states participate because JCAHO accreditation is
required for certain federal funding programs. Kym Oltrogge, An Ounce Of Prevention Is Worth A
Pound of Cure: The Need for States to Legislate in the Area of Hospital Professional Review Committee
Proceedings, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961, n.4 (1989). In addition, JCAHO accreditation is required
if a hospital is affiliated with a medical school. Id.
8. As early as 1919, the American College of Surgeons organized the hospital medical staff
concept when it established minimum standards in which physicians and surgeons had to comply in
order to practice medicine in hospitals. Mark A. Kadzielski et al., The Hospital Medical Staff: What is
its Future?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 987, 988 (1995).
9. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 6, at I 1.
10. Susan 0. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review
Information: More Imagined Than Real, 7 J. L. & HEALTH 169, 170 (1992/1993).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11111-152(1994).
12. Id. § 11101(1).
13. Id. § 11101. The HCQIA was enacted after congressional findings revealed an increase in
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In order to get hospitals and physicians to perform peer review, the
HCQIA protects these entities against damages in suits initiated by phy-
sicians who lose their hospital privileges after peer review action has been
taken.14 Nevertheless, hospitals and physicians, also known as profes-
sional review bodies,'5 are not protected unless the peer review actions 16
they take meet the standards promulgated in the HCQIA.17 In addition,
if a doctor is disciplined after peer review action has been taken, the
HCQIA requires the reviewing body to report the action taken to the
state medical board.18 The state medical board is then responsible for re-
porting this information to the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (Secretary).19
Other information which must be reported to the Secretary is the
amount paid on a medical malpractice claim.20 The entity which makes
payment on the medical malpractice claim is responsible for making this
the occurrence of medical malpractice, the national need to restrict the ability of incompetent
physicians to move state to state without having to disclose previous incompetent performance, the
need to encourage physicians to participate in effective peer review, and the need to provide
protections and incentives to physicians who engage in effective peer review. Id.
14. Id.; see also Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 (1992) (finding that participants in a profes-
sional review action are entitled to HCQIA immunity if they demonstrate the peer review action
complied with fairness standards as set out in the HCQIA, they satisfied the requirement of adequate
notice and hearing, the results of the action were reported to state authorities, and the action
commenced on or after the effective date of the HCQIA); Mathews v. Lancaster General Hospital,
883 F. Supp. 1016, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that the HCQIA provides immunity from money
damages but does not provide immunity from suits arising from professional physician review activities
or from injunctive or declaratory relief).
15. "The term 'professional review body' means a health care entity and the governing body or
any committee of a health care entity which conducts professional review activity, and includes any
committee of the medical staff of such an entity when assisting the governing body in a professional
review activity." 42 U.S.C. § 11151(11) (1994).
16. Under the HCQIA:
[tihe term 'professional review action' means an action or recommendation of a
professional review body which is taken or made in the conduct of professional review
activity, which is based on the competence or professional conduct of an individual
physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely the health or welfare of a
patient or patients), and which affects (or may affect) adversely the clinical privileges,
or membership in a professional society, of the physician.
42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (1994).
17. Id. § 11151(9). To meet these standards, these actions must be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter, (3) after adequate notice
and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other
procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the
reasonable belief that the act was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable
effort to obtain facts.
42 U.S.C. § 111 12(a)(l-4) (1994). A peer review action is not based on competence if it is based on
the physician's relationship with a professional society or association, the advertising, charging of
lower fees, or engaging in other competitive acts, the financial arrangement for delivering health
care, and the relationship the physician has with practitioners who are not physicians. 42 U.S.C. §
11151(9).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (1994).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 11134(b) (1994).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (1994).
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report.21 In addition, the paying entity must also identify the hospital or
physician for whose benefit the payment was made and the injuries
sustained by the patient. 22 This information is then compiled in a
national data bank, consisting of information on all physicians who have
been the subject of disciplinary actions, which hospitals throughout the
country can access. 23 Thus, the creation of the national data bank is
consistent with the HCQIA's requirement that hospitals obtain such
information before hiring any health care professionals. 2
4
B. PURPOSE OF PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE PEER REVIEW
PROCESS
In addition to the protection against damages for hospitals and
physicians who participate in the peer review process, the HCQIA25 and
many states 26 have peer review statutes providing for confidentiality. 27
Many states also have statutes which provide a medical peer review
privilege, but the HCQIA does not address this issue. 28 The purpose of
these statutes is to protect the communications that occur during peer
review proceedings.2 9 The rationale is that without such statutes, phy-
sicians may be reluctant to participate in peer review because of the fear
that the information discussed during the proceedings will later be used
in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or that they may be called to
testify against their colleagues.3 0
21. Id. § 11131(a).
22. Id. § 1131(b)(1)(4).
23. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 6384.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a)(1) (1994).
25. See Pagano v. Oroville Hospital, 145 F.R.D. 683 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that the HCQIA
provides for confidentiality only on information provided to the national data bank pursuant to the
Act).
26. The following are examples of states that have confidentiality provisions in their peer review
statutes: ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.030 (Michie 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 766.101(5) (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-3204 (1983); HAW. REV. STAT. § 624-25.5(b) (1993);
IND. CODE § 34-4-12.6-2 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.377(2) (Michie 1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 3296 (West 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. Ill, § 204 (1988); MINN. STAT. § 145.65
(1971); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.035(4) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
71-2047, 71-2048, 25-12,123 (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 31-08-
01, 23-01-02.1) (Supp. 1997), PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.4 (West 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
5-37.3-7 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20 (Law. Co-op 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219 (1994);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1443 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (1980); and Wis. STAT. § 146.38 (1992).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b) (1994).
28. See Pagano v. Oroville Hospital, 145 F.R.D. 683 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that there is no
federal statutory basis for medical peer review privilege); Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91 (D.N.J. 1989)
(finding that to the extent that a privilege exists, its application should be limited to those situations
where privilege serves a greater public good than predominate the principle that courts seek the truth).
29. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 10, at 171.
30. Id. Prior to Congress' enactment of the HCQIA, one of its initial findings was that there was
a threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws which unreasonably discouraged
physicians from participating in peer review. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (1994).
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Privileged information is not admissible as evidence in a trial. 3 I In
peer review settings, privilege protects the entities conducting the pro-
ceedings, not the person who is the subject of peer review. 32 Conversely,
confidentiality deals with the obligation to refrain from disclosing
information to third parties except with respect to professional review
activity. 33 Thus, although privilege and confidentiality are two separate
concepts, they often work together 34 because if there is a privilege to
protect certain information, there is also a requirement to keep that
information confidential.3 5
C. COMPETING PUBLIC INTERESTS
In order to improve the quality of health care that patients receive, it
is essential for health care providers to have information regarding phy-
sicians against whom peer review action was taken. 36 Congress recog-
nized this need when it enacted the HCQIA because under § 11135 of
the Act, hospitals are required to request information from the Secretary
whenever a physician or health care practitioner applies to be on the
medical staff at that hospital.37 The purpose of this requirement is to
prohibit incompetent physicians from moving to different hospitals or
states and continuing their practices or unprofessional behavior. 38 Thus,
this section of the HCQIA works to reduce the number of injuries and
deaths associated with incompetent physicians.
Peer review information is also valuable to non-medical entities.
For instance, peer review information is very useful to litigants in
medical malpractice actions because the information may assist in
proving or disproving essential elements of the claims for relief. 39 In
addition, peer review information must be disclosed to the Secretary or
the private or public agency designated to receive such information, in
order to provide licensing boards and other health care providers with
the information as prescribed by the HCQIA.40
Beyond the medical community, litigants, and the Secretary, other
entities such as insurance companies, the media, consumer groups, and
competing health care providers may also have an interest in peer review
31. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 10, at 179.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 192.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 6384.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 11135 (1994).
38. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 6385.
39. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 10, at 174.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11136-11137 (1994).
19971 481
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information for various reasons.41 Although it is easy to identify various
entities who may compete for access to peer review information, it is
essential to realize the tensions between these entities gaining access to
the information and the statutes which protect the information from
being disclosed. Thus, the interplay of privilege and confidentiality stat-
utes with the competing public interests provides for interesting debate.
42
D. THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION POSITION ON PEER REVIEW
The American Medical Association (AMA) is a leading supporter of
medical peer review. The 1997 Policy Compendium43 of the AMA states
that the AMA: "(1) strongly reaffirms its continuing commitment to the
development and maintenance of voluntary, 44 professionally directed
peer review of medical care; and (2) encourages physicians to expand
their efforts to ensure that such care is of high quality, appropriate
duration and reasonable cost."45 In addition, the AMA takes the posi-
tion that it is the ethical duty of a physician to share truthful information
about the quality of care a colleague gives to his or her patients when
41. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 10, at 174.
42. See Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145 F.R.D. 683, 694 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act provides for confidentiality only of information provided to national
repository pursuant to the Act); Manthe v. VanBolden, 133 F.R.D. 497, 503 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (finding
that the federal statute controlling the release of information regarding physicians had no application
to documents in the hospital's peer review file); Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 99 (D.N.J. 1989)
(holding that the federal statutory privilege did not apply to hospital's peer review committee in
antitrust action brought by the anesthesiologist unless requested information had been "reported"
under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act).
43. The Policy Compendium is a compilation of the current polices of the AMA.
44. The AMA has established principles for voluntary medical peer review. House of Delegates
Policy H-375.997 states:
(I) Medical peer review is an organized effort to evaluate and analyze medical care
services delivered to patients and to assure the quality and appropriateness of these
services. Peer review should exist to maintain and improve the quality of medical care.
(2) Medical peer review should be a local process.
(3) Physicians should be ultimately responsible for all peer review of medical care.
(4) Physicians involved in peer review should be representatives of the medical com-
munity; participation should be structured to maximize the involvement of the medical
community. Any peer review process should provide for consideration of the views of
individual physicians or groups of physicians or institutions under review.
(5) Peer review evaluations should be based on appropriateness, medical necessity and
efficiency of services to assure quality medical care.
(6) Any system of medical peer review should have established procedures.
(7) Peer review of medical practice and the patterns of medical practice of individual
physicians, groups of physicians, and physicians within institutions should be an ongoing
process of assessment and evaluation.
(8) Peer review should be an educational process for physicians to assure quality medi-
cal services.
(9) Any peer review process should protect the confidentiality of medical information
obtained and used in conducting peer review.
AMERICAN MED. Assoc. COUNCIL ON LONG RANGE PLANNING & DEV., AM. MED. Assoc., POLICY
COMPENDIUM 403-04 (1996).
45. Id. (referring to House of Delegates Policy H-375.996).
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such information is requested by a credentialing body, so long as the
information shared is not a proceeding or a document which is protected
by a statute or regulation as confidential peer review information.
46
The AMA also recognizes that confidentiality is an essential com-
ponent to the peer review process. The AMA advocates legislation to
ensure confidentiality of the peer review process. 47 Further, in order to
preserve confidentiality, the AMA encourages medical staff peer review
committees to exclude non-physicians from evaluating the professional
practices of licensed physicians.48
III. STATE LEGISLATION FOSTERING PEER REVIEW
A. NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 23-01-02.1
The North Dakota Legislature approved the first legislation to
protect peer review records in 1969, and the statute was subsequently
amended in 1981, 1983, and 1985. 49 The law, which was effective until
April 18, 1997,50 stated:
Any information, data, reports, or records made available to a
mandatory hospital committee or extended care facility
committee as required by state or federal law or by the joint
commission on accreditation of hospitals by a hospital or
extended care facility or any physician or surgeon or group ot
physicians or surgeons operating a clinic or outpatient care
facility in this state or to an internal quality assurance review
committee of any hospital or extended care facili1y in this state
are confidential and may be used by such committees and the
members thereof only in the exercise of the proper functions
of the committees. The proceedings and records of such a
committee are not subject to subpoena or discovery or
introduction into evidence in any civil action arising out of any
matter which is the subject of consideration by the committee.
Information, documents, or records otherwise available from
original sources are not immune from discovery or use in any
civil action merely because they were presented during the
proceedings of such a committee, nor may any person who
testified before such a committee or who is a member of it be
46. Id. (referring to House of Delegates Policy H-375.984).
47. Id. (referring to House of Delegates Policy H-375.992).
48. Id. (referring to House of Delegates Policy H-375.993).
49. 1969 N.D. LAWS 251; 1981 N.D. LAWS 278; 1983 N.D. LAWS 287; 1985 N.D. LAWS 288.
50. This statute was repealed, effective April 18, 1997. 1997 N.D. LAWS 234; see also N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1 (Supp. 1997).
1997] 483
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prevented from testifying as to matters within that person's
knowledge. but a witness cannot be asked about that witness'
testimony before the committee. This section does not relieve
any person of any liability which the person has incurred or
may incur to a patient as a result of furnishing health care to
the patient. No physician, hospital, or institution furnishing
information, data, reports, or records to any such committee
with respect to any patient examined or treated by such
physician or confined in such hospital or institution is, by
reason of furnishing such information, liable in damages to
any person, or answerable for willful violation of a privileged
communication. No member of such a committee is liable in
damages to any person for any action taken or recommen-
dation made within the scope of the functions of the committee
if the committee member acts without malice and in the
reasonable belief that such action or recommendation is
warranted by the facts known to him. 51
B. NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 31-08-01
Additional legislation to protect peer review records was enacted in
1975, by amending the statute governing the admissibility of business
records. That statute, until April 18, 1997, provided:
5 2
A record of an act, condition, or event shall be competent
evidence insofar as relevant, if:
1. The custodian or other qualified witness testifies
to its identity and the mode of its preparation.
2. It was made in the regular course of business, at or
near the time of the act, condition, or event.
3. The sources of information and the method and
time of preparation, in the opinion of the court,
were such as to justify its admission.
For the purpose of this section, the term "business" shall
include every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling,
or operation of institutions, whether carried on for profit or
not. The records and proceedings of any regularly constituted
medical review committee of a licensed medical hospital or a
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1 (1991). The 1981 amendments are indicated in italics, the
1983 amendments (except for minor grammatical amendments) by underlining, and the 1985
amendments by underlined italics.
52. This statute was amended, effective April 18, 1997. 1997 N.D. LAWS 234.
484 [VOL. 73:477
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medical society in this state shall not be subject to discovery or
admissible as evidence.53
C. NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 43-17.1-05.1
A 1993 amendment to the law governing the Commission on Medi-
cal Competency began an erosion of the quarter-century of legislation to
protect peer review records. 54 The law required reports to the Commis-
sion concerning physicians "who may be medically incompetent, guilty
of unprofessional conduct, or mentally or physically unable to safely
engage in the practice of medicine." 55 This statute did not include any
exception for records or information which was previously protected by
the 1969-1985 peer review legislation:
A physician, the state medical association and its com-
ponents, a health care institution in the state, a state agency, a
law enforcement agency in the state, or a court in the state
having actual knowledge that a licensed physician may be
medically incompetent, guilty of unprofessional conduct, or
mentally or physically unable to safely engage in the practice
of medicine shall promptly report that information to the
commission. A medical licensee or any institution from which
the medical licensee voluntarily resigns or voluntarily limits the
licensee's staff privileges, shall report that licensee's action to
the commission if that action occurs while the licensee is under
formal or informal investigation by the institution or a
committee of the institution for any reason related to possible
medical incompetence, unprofessional conduct, or mental or
physical impairment. Upon receiving a report concerning a
licensee, or on its own motion, the commission may investigate
any evidence that appears to show a licensee is or may be medi-
cally incompetent, guilty of unprofessional conduct, or mental-
ly or physically incapable of the proper practice of medicine.
Any person required to report under this section, who makes a
report in good faith, may not be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion or civil liability for making the report. A physician, who
obtains information in the course of a physician-patient
relationship in which the patient is another physician, is not
required to report if the treating physician successfully
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-01 (1996). The 1975 amendment is indicated by italics. 1975 N.D.
LAWS 292.
54. 1993 N.D. LAWS 426.
55. Id.
1997]
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counsels the other physician to limit or withdraw from practice
to the extent required by the impairment. 56
IV. EFFORTS BY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PLAINTIFFS TO
OBTAIN "CONFIDENTIAL" PEER REVIEW RECORDS
For many years attorneys assumed that peer review records would
not be admissible in medical malpractice actions (i.e., were confidential
and privileged). 57 That assumption was attacked in several actions
against a Minot physician concerning medical treatment from 1991 to
1992 in Trinity Medical Center, Inc. v. Holum.58 After summarizing
Trinity's recruitment of Dr. Mark De Naples, his treatment of three
patients in 1991 through 1992, the resulting lawsuits against several
defendants, and the fact that Dr. De Naples was later diagnosed with
Alzheimer's Disease, the supreme court explained:
Disputes arose during discovery over application of the peer
review/quality assurance privilege, codified in Sections 23-01-
02.1 and 31-08-01, N.D.C.C. Keplin [one of the plaintiffs]
sought, through interrogatories and depositions, to elicit infor-
mation relating to Dr. De Naple's practice at Trinity, and
specific information regarding any in-hospital review of Dr. De
Naple's care of these plaintiffs. Trinity [one of the defen-
dants] objected, asserting application of the statutory privilege
and urging an expansive reading of the privilege to cover all
documents and information produced, collected, or presented
in the entire quality assurance process. Keplin urged a narrow
view of the privilege to cover only testimony to and discussions
of the quality assurance committee. After briefing and a
hearing, the district court, on June 30, 1995, issued its order dir-
ecting Trinity to produce all requested information and docu-
ments, and to produce individuals requested for depositions,
except:
Any complaints regarding Dr. De Naples made by
physicians, nurses or hospital staff to the internal
Quality Assurance Committee and any records of
those complaints, or discussions of those complaints,
with the internal Quality Assurance Committee.
56. N.D. CENr. CODE § 43-17.1-05 (1993). This statute was amended twice in 1997. 1997 N.D.
LAWS 234, 373.
57. Interview with Lance Schreiner, Partner in Zuger Kirmis & Smith, in Bismarck, N.D. (June 3,
1997).
58. 544 N.W.2d 148, 150-51 (N.D. 1996).
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The district court granted Trinity's motion for a stay pending
application to this court for a supervisory writ.59
The supreme court granted the supervisory writ to address two
issues: "Which hospital committees are covered by the privilege and
what information and documents are protected?" 60 The parties, of
course, differed about which committees were protected by the state laws.
The supreme court continued:
Keplin asserts that these statutes protect only committees
mandated by law or the joint commission [JCAHO], and a
single medical review/quality assurance committee of the medi-
cal staff. Trinity asserts that the statutes are not meant to limit
coverage to specific committees, but are designed to protect the
entire peer review/quality assurance process from disclosure.
Trinity argues this protection extends beyond mandatory and
quality assurance committees to any hospital committee per-
forming any quality assurance function, to departments, and to
individual hospital employees assigned to a quality assurance
function. . . . Trinity argues that the privilege should also be
extended to cover the entire quality assurance process, includ-
ing other, non-mandatory hospital committees, and depart-
ments and individuals when performing quality assurance
functions. Trinity asserts that the public policy underlying the
peer review privilege, as expressed in caselaw and statutes from
other jurisdictions supports this broad protection ... 61
The supreme court disagreed with Trinity's broad interpretation of
the North Dakota peer review laws:
If our legislature had intended to provide a broad statutory
privilege for the entire quality assurance process, or for all
committees performing any quality assurance function, it could
have said so. The language employed in our statutes limits the
privilege to committees mandated by law or the JCAHO
standards, and to an internal quality assurance/medical review
committee.
Our conclusion is further supported by the legislative
histories of Sections 23-01-02.1 and 31-08-01, N.D.C.C.,
which demonstrate that the primary purpose of the peer review
59. Trinity Medical Center, Inc. v. Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 151 (N.D. 1996) (footnotes omitted
and explanation in brackets added).
60. Id. at 152.
61. Id. at 154.
1997] 487
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privilege was to encourage physician participation in the peer
review process. Concerns were expressed that physicians would
be unwilling to serve on quality assurance committees, and
would not feel free to openly discuss the performance of other
doctors practicing in the hospital, without assurance that their
discussions in committee would be confidential and privileged.
It was this purpose to encourage frank and open physician
participation, and the resulting improvement in patient care,
which underlies the privilege. The legislative history, however,
does not address similar concerns for participation by
departments, nurses, or other hospital employees....
We conclude on this record, that the privilege applies
only to the Medical Staff Quality Assurance Committee, the
Safety Committee, the Infection Committee, the Medical Staff
Executive Committee, and the Credentials Committee. 62
After the supreme court addressed the committees that were pro-
tected by the peer review law, the court focused on the information that
was protected by the law. The parties' positions on this issue were also
diametrically opposed:
Trinity asserts that, under Section 23-01-02.1, all informa-
tion, data, reports, or records made available to protected com-
mittees are privileged. Keplin asserts the privilege is limited to
"proceedings and records of" protected committees. 63
The supreme court sided with the plaintiffs-patients on this issue:
Trinity's argument is flawed by its misreading of Section
23-01-02.1 .... Trinity has confused confidentiality with privi-
lege . . . .Trinity argues that, even if the privilege applies only
to proceedings and records, information provided to the
committee and data collected by the departments and hospital
employees for review by the committee are included within
"proceedings and records of" the committee. The statute,
however, clearly distinguishes between "information, data,
reports, or records made available" to the committee, and the
"proceedings and records of' the committee. The former are
merely confidential; the latter are privileged.64
62. Id. at 155.
63. Id. at 156.
64. Id. at 156-57.
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Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that "only the proceedings
and records of covered committees are protected by the statutory
privilege." 65
Trinity Medical Center immediately caused a furor-and created
anxiety-in the medical community. Plaintiffs could now subpoena
peer review records which were previously considered privileged and
physicians were reluctant to participate in a peer review process which
could subject them to increased risk of personal liability. For example,
one day after the opinion was released, the counsel for the North Dakota
Hospital Association66 advised the Association:
It would be difficult to overstate the negative impact this
opinion will have on the operations of every hospital in North
Dakota. For many years, North Dakota's hospitals have relied
on sections 23-01-02.1 and 31-08-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code to protect from discovery a broad range of
information gathered by hospital departments and personnel
and utilized by quality assurance and peer review committees
of the hospital medical staff. In the Trinity Medical Center
case, the North Dakota Supreme Court has applied an
extremely narrow and strict statutory interpretation to those
provisions. It would now appear that little of the information
previously thought protected will be granted protection by the
courts of North Dakota.67
V. EFFORTS BY THE NORTH DAKOTA COMMISSION ON
MEDICAL COMPETENCY TO OBTAIN "CONFIDENTIAL"
PEER REVIEW RECORDS
The North Dakota Commission on Medical Competency was
established in 1977.68 The role of the Commission was summarized in
Commission on Medical Competency v. Racek:69
The Commission is an arm of the Board of Medical Examiners
(Board), and it investigates allegations of misconduct or
incompetency against physicians licensed in this state. If the
Commission decides that neither disciplinary action nor further
investigation are warranted, it may dismiss the matter. If the
65. Id. at 157.
66. The North Dakota Hospital Association is now the North Dakota Health Care Association.
67. Memorandum from John C. Kapsner, Attorney for Kapsner & Kapsner, to Arnold "Chip"
Thomas, Director of North Dakota Hospital Association (February 29, 1996) (on file with the NORTH
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW).
68. N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17.1-02 (1993).
69. 527 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1995).
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Commission decides that there are grounds for disciplinary
action, it files a formal complaint with the Board. Although all
records of the Commission are confidential and exempt from
the open records law under NDCC 43-17.1-08, the records of
the Board are not exempt and are open to the public.
Accordingly, once the Commission files a formal disciplinary
complaint with the Board, it becomes a public record. 70
The Commission initiated an informal investigation in 1992, con-
cerning a Fargo physician, which the Commission initially designated
Dr. Doe. The actions by the Commission are summarized in Racek:
The Commission conducted a lengthy investigation of Dr. Doe
beginning in 1991. In November 1993 the Commission voted
to file a formal disciplinary complaint against Dr. Doe. Dr.
Doe learned of the pending investigation, and settlement
negotiations began between the Commission and Dr. Doe and
his attorneys. The Commission informed Dr. Doe generally of
the nature of the charges against him, and identified eight
specific patient files that entered into the complaint. Dr. Doe
was also given a draft copy of the complaint. When settlement
negotiations broke down, Dr. Doe requested and received a
confidential conference before the Commission under NDCC
43-17.1-06(6). After Dr. Doe, his witnesses, and his attorneys
appeared at the June 9, 1994, conference, the Commission
again voted to file a disciplinary complaint with the Board.7 1
Dr. Doe sued the Commission in an effort to avoid the filing of a
public complaint with the Board. Dr. Doe was successful in the district
court:
Dr. Doe then sought a temporary restraining order and pre-
liminary injunction against the Commission in district court.
After a hearing, the court ordered the Commission to refrain
from filing a complaint or making public any allegations
against Dr. Doe until it has advised Dr. Doe of the specific
nature of the complaints against him, including names of the
complainants, and holds a confidential hearing giving Dr. Doe
a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to be heard. The
Commission sought certification under NDRCivP 54(b) to
facilitate an immediate appeal; the district court refused. The
70. Commission on Med. Competency v. Racek, 527 N.W.2d 262, 263 (N.D. 1995) (interpreting
N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 43-17.1, -17.1-05 (2-3), -17.1-08, 44-04-18 (1993 & Supp. 1997)).
71. Id.
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Commission now seeks a supervisory writ, alleging that it has
no alternative remedy. 72
The respective positions of the parties were clearly outlined in the
proceedings before the district court. For example, Dr. Doe contended,
in the amended complaint: "[Dr. Doe] has been systematically denied
knowledge and information of the precise identity of [the Commis-
sion's] informants and complainants and the nature and extent of their
investigation and inquiries and has been effectively foreclosed from
conducting an investigation so as to be able to prepare a competent and
complete defense." 73 The Commission responded that:
There are no requirements that the Commission on Medical
Competency afford any notice of its investigation, nor that it
take any steps to provide copies of reports, identity of
complaining witnesses, or any of the other information that
[Dr. Doe], in this action, has demanded.... [T]he Commission
maintains that there are no due process rights available to [Dr.
Doe] at this stage in the proceeding. 74
The documents filed with the court also reveal a looming battle
between the parties concerning access to peer review records. The
amended complaint alleged:
In the course of the investigation, [the Commission's] counsel
attempted to subpoena medical records from the hospital at
which Plaintiff has medical staff privileges and to secure other
records, documents and reports of a medical chart review
commissioned by hospital in regard to a general departmental
review of certain files and medical records pursuant to confi-
dential quality assurance and peer review processes. [The Com-
mission's] counsel attempted to force the hospital to reveal the
results of the hospital's peer review process, despite knowing
that such proceedings and records are absolutely exempt from
subpoena, discovery, or introduction into evidence under
N.D.C.C. § 23-01-02.1 and specifically not subject to the
subpoena powers of the Commission as set forth in N.D.C.C. §
43-17.1-06.75
72. Id.
73. Am. Compl. (July 20, 1994) at i10, Commission on Med. Competency v. Christoferson, Civ.
No. 95-02951 (District Court, East Central Judicial District) (1995).
74. Return to Application for T.R.O., Temporary Inj. and Permanent Inj. (July 6, 1994) at 2,
Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-02951).
75. Am. Compl. (July 20, 1994) at 9, Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-02951).
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An affidavit filed by the Commission disputed the discovery
allegation in the amended complaint and in an affidavit filed by Dr.
Doe:
[A]t no time has your affiant intentionally attempted to secure
from a hospital at which plaintiff practices, records which are
by law exempt from subpoena, discovery or introduction into
evidence, that such issue was fully addressed and your affiant's
intentions made clear, in Dakota Hospital vs. Commission on
Medical Competency, Civil No. 93-1963, heard by the Cass
County District Court on October 28, 1993, before the
Honorable Cynthia Rothe.76
The court, after hearing oral arguments at the University of North
Dakota School of Law in October of 1994, granted the supervisory writ
and directed the district court to vacate its order. The court declared that
"Dr. Doe has no enforceable right to a confidential pre-complaint
hearing by the Commission to clear his name before the complaint is
filed publicly with the board." 77 The supreme court's decision allowed
the Commission to file the formal complaint with the Board, which
continued the investigation of Dr. Doe, now identified as Lee Christofer-
son, Jr., M.D. The Commission was soon skirmishing with clinics and
hospitals over its efforts to subpoena peer review records concerning Dr.
Christoferson.
The Board served a subpoena on Dakota Clinic in July 1995. The
subpoena demanded the following documents:
1. Copies of any and all incident reports or other complaints
(either oral or written) received by Risk Management,
Quality Assurance, or any other administrative body
regarding Dr. Lee Christoferson, Jr., beginning January 1,
1988 through December 31, 1993. This includes, but is
not limited to, all paper documentation, computer print-
outs, and information stored on computer software,
programs and/or disks.
2. All documents that record, refer, or relate in any way to
claims which the clinic, its counsel, or representative
submitted on behalf of Dr. Lee Christoferson, Jr., M.D. to
medical malpractice insurers, including, but not limited to
76. Aff. of Special Assistant Attorney General John M. Olson (July 6, 1994), at 13, Christoferson,
(Civ. No. 95-0295 1).
77. Racek, 527 N.W.2d at 268.
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complaints, requests for coverage, medical reports, notes
or memoranda.
3. A copy of the credential and/or personnel file of Dr. Lee
Christoferson, Jr., M.D.78
Concerning the items described in 1 of the subpoena, the clinic
responded that it would provide "incident reports" or complaints, but
the clinic refused to provide the other documents:
The clinic asserts the quality assurance privilege and the
attorney/ client privilege, however, to the extent that this request
may be construed as requiring the production of notes or
minutes of any quality assurance or peer review proceeding or
any correspondence exchanged between Dakota Clinic, Ltd.
and its attorneys or their representatives. 79
Similarly, concerning 2 of the subpoena, the clinic stated in part:
"Objection is made to this request on the basis that it seeks information
which is protected by the quality assurance/peer review privilege, the
attorney-client privilege, and the work product privilege." The clinic
also objected to 3 of the subpoena for the same reasons as 1 and 2.
Less than two weeks later, the Board sent similar, and much broader,
subpoenas to Dakota Clinic and Dakota Heartland. 8 0 Both subpoenas
demanded: "All proceedings and records of the peer review conducted
by your institution regarding Dr. Lee A. Christoferson, Jr. (See Arnett v.
Dal Cielo, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995))."81 The clinic's
response to the second subpoena was curt: "The Clinic asserts the
quality assurance review privilege (peer review privilege), the attorney/
client privilege, and the work product privilege with regard to all
proceedings and records of any quality assurance or peer review
conducted regarding Dr. Lee Christoferson, Jr."82 Dakota Heartland's
response was also very brief:
Dakota Heartland's objection is based on but not limited to the
following reasons:
1. The information sought by the Commission is not subject
to subpoena or discovery per N.D.C.C. §§ 23-01-02.1,
31-08-01, and 43-17.1-06;
78. Am. Subpoena (July 28, 1995) at 1, Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-0295 1).
79. Objections and Resp. to Am. Subpoena (August 2, 1995) at 2, Christoferson, (Civ. No.
95-02951).
80. Both facilities are located in Fargo, North Dakota.
81. Subpoena (August 14, 1995) at 1, Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-02951).
82. Objections and Resp. to Subpoena (August 21, 1995) at 1, Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-02951).
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2. The information sought by the Commission is protected
by the common law critical self-analysis privilege. Conse-
quently, it is not subject to discovery or subpoena. 83
The Commission was similarly unsuccessful in obtaining
information about peer review activities during depositions
of key witnesses.
The Commission responded by filing a motion in the proceedings
before the Board: "Complainant, the Commission on Medical Compe-
tency, brings this Motion seeking an Order from the administrative law
judge compelling Respondent to fully answer deposition questions and
produce all documents regarding the peer review . .. "84 After
considering extensive briefs from the parties, the administrative law
judge partially granted the Commission's motion. The order stated, in
part: "Both Dakota Clinic and Dakota Heartland must produce all peer
review records or information in their possession regarding Christofer-
son, as well as the entity's personnel file on him." 85 The order also
explained the basis for the decision:
This is not a civil suit concerning, e.g., malpractice. This is an
administrative action against the license of Dr. Christoferson.
The public has a vital interest in quality health care. This
interest is not subordinated by the North Dakota statutes, or in
any case law, or in federal law, cited by the Complainant,
Respondent, and Dakota Clinic or Dakota Heartland . . .
Again, these records and files may still be confidential under
the law and prevented from public disclosure, but they are
discoverable and may be admissible in a licensing proceeding.
This order does not apply to the minutes of the Quality
Assurance Committee, nor does it apply to truly attorney-client
privilege information (i.e., information specifically directed to
or from the Clinic's or Hospital's attorney; or correspondence
between the hospital and its attorney or the clinic and its
attorney; or any information about malpractice litigation or
strategy resulting because of discussion with any attorney). 86
The subpoenaed facilities did not produce the peer review records.
When the Commission filed a Motion for Enforcement with the state
83. Dakota Heartland's Objection to Subpoena (August 22, 1995), Christoferson, (Civ. No.
95-0295 I).
84. Complainant's Mot. to Compel Produc. of Docs. and Resp. to Dep. Questions of Dakota
(August 28, 1995) at 1, Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-0295 1).
85. Order on Motion to Compel Produc. of Docs. and Resp. to Dep. Questions of Dakota
(September 18, 1995) at 1, Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-0295 1).
86. Id. at 1-2.
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district court, the North Dakota Medical Association submitted an amicus
curiae brief because of its concern "that eliminating the confidentiality
of the peer review process will jeopardize the integrity of the . . .
process." 87 The amicus curiae brief, in addition to commenting on the
disputed statutes, explained the AMA's position concerning the
importance of the peer review process and the confidentiality of peer
review records. 88 The Commission objected to the filing of the amicus
curiae brief,89 but the court referenced the brief in its subsequent order.
The district court affirmed the decision of the administrative law
judge. The order stated, in part:
The discovery order at issue does not reach minutes of the
Quality Assurance Committee or "truly attorney-client privi-
leged information." The order also states that the information
sought may remain confidential even if discoverable "in a
licensing proceeding."
The hearing officer's order for discovery is within his
authority under the law and is not an abuse of discretion. It is
neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER OF THE COURT
that the Administrative Hearing Officer's "Order on Motion to
Compel Production of Documents and Responses to Deposi-
tion Questions of Dakota". . . is hereby ENFORCED with the
full contempt powers of this court. 90
Dakota Heartland promptly appealed the district court order to the
North Dakota Supreme Court and concurrently applied for a stay from
the district court. 91 Dakota Heartland also submitted a petition for a
supervisory writ to the supreme court. 92
Meanwhile, the Commission and Dr. Christoferson negotiated a
settlement and Dakota Heartland submitted a motion to withdraw the
notice of appeal. 93 The Commission, in an effort to obtain a supreme
87. Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Submit Amicus Curiae Br. (October 4, 1995), Christoferson, (Civ. No.
95-2951).
88. Br. of Amicus Curiae N.D. Med. Assoc. (October 9, 1995) at 2, Christoferson, (Civ. No.
95-02951).
89. Complainant's Br. in Opp'n to N.D. Med. Assoc. Amicus Curiae Br. (October 10, 1995),
Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-02951).
90. Order to Enforce Disc. (October It, 1995), Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-02951).
91. Notice of Appeal (October 17, 1995), Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-0295 1).
92. Pet. for Supervisory Writ (October 25, 1995), Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-02951).
93. Mot. to Withdraw and Dismiss Its Appeal and Pet. for a Supervisory Writ (November 2,
1995), Christoferson, (Civ. No. 95-0295 1).
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court decision on the issue, objected to the motion.94 The Commission
argued:
While the Hospital asserts that the issue is now moot, the
Commission believes that this issue is of great public im-
portance and is one that is capable of reptition [sic] yet evading
review. The Commission does not believe hospitals should be
able to hide evidence of a physician's neglect by beginning a
peer review of that physician. The peer review should not pro-
vide cover for an internal process that is not working to protect
the public. Hospitals and the state licensing board should work
together, not in opposite, to protect the public. 95
The supreme court, obviously declining to provide an advisory
opinion about the issue, granted Dakota Heartland's motion.
VI. COMPROMISE LEGISLATION WHICH ADDRESSED THE
COMPETING INTERESTS
Peer review in North Dakota was temporarily in chaos for at least
three reasons:
1. Plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions had access to
documents which were previously considered exempt
from discovery.
2. There was continued uncertainty, and the promise of con-
tinuing litigation, concerning access by the Commission
on Medical Competency to peer review records.
3. The 1993 legislation, section 43-17.1-05.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code, required that members of a peer
review committee "having actual knowledge that a
licensed physician may be medically incompetent, guilty
of unprofessional conduct, or mentally or physically
unable to safely engage in the practice of medicine shall
promptly report that information to the commission."
Therefore, the North Dakota medical community recommended
emergency legislation, Senate Bill 2301, in the 1997 session to address
all three issues. The legislation triggered a public policy debate; the
medical community sought confidentiality and privilege, the trial lawyers
sought access to peer review records, and the media expressed its
94. Commission on Med. Competency's Objection to Dakota Heartland's Mot. to Withdraw and
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traditional opposition to confidentiality. After considerable debate, the
legislature approved, and the governor signed, Senate Bill 301. The bill
became effective on April 18, 1997, when it was filed with the Secretary
of State. 96
A. CONFIDENTIALITY
Senate Bill 2301 reaffirmed that all peer review records are
confidential. Section 23-34-02, now states: "Peer review records 97 are
confidential and may be used by a peer review committee 98 and the
committee members only for conducting a professional peer review." 99
B. PRIVILEGE
Senate Bill 2301 clearly declared that all peer review records are
privileged with only three exceptions. Section 23-34-03, provides:
Peer review records are privileged and are not subject to sub-
poena or discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil or
administrative action, except:
1. Records gathered from an original source that is
not a peer review committee;
2. Testimony from any person as to matters within
that person's knowledge, provided the informa-
tion was not obtained by the person as a result
96. With the passage of an emergency clause, the bill was effective when it was filed with the
Secretary of State. N.D. CONST. ART. IV, § 13.
97. The term "peer review records" is broadly defined in the new § 23-34-01(4):
"Peer review records" means all data, information, reports, documents, findings,
compilations and summaries, testimony, and any other records generated by, acquired
by, or given to a peer review committee as a part of any professional peer review,
regardless of when the record is created. The term does not include original patient
source documents. Peer review records also include all communications relating to a
professional peer review, whether written or oral, between peer review committee
members, peer review committee members and the peer review committee's staff, or
peer review committee members and other persons participating in a professional peer
review, including the person who is the subject of the professional peer review.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-01(4) (Supp. 1997).
98. The term "peer review committee" is also broadly defined in the new § 23-34-01(3):
"Peer review committee" means any committee of a health care organization, composed
of health care providers, employees, administrators, consultants, agents, or members of
the health care organization's governing body, which conducts professional peer review.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-01(3) ( Supp. 1997).
99. The term "professional peer review" is defined in § 23-34-01(5):
"Professional peer review" means all procedures a peer review committee uses or
functions it performs to monitor, evaluate, and take actions to review the medical care
provided to patients by health care organizations or health care providers to improve
patient care and treatment or to provide quality assurance.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-01(5) (Supp. 1997).
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of the person's participation in a professional
peer review; or
3. Peer review records subpoenaed in an investi-
gation conducted by the commission on medi-
cal competency pursuant to chapter 43-17.1 or
subpoenaed in a disciplinary action before the
board of medical examiners pursuant to section
43-17-30.1. Any peer review records provided
to the commission or introduced as evidence in
any disciplinary action before the board are
confidential and are not subject to subpoena,
discovery or admissibility into evidence in any
civil or administrative action, and are not public
records subject to section 44-04-18 and section
6 of article XI of the Constitution of North
Dakota.
During the Senate hearings, a senator questioned whether this
section would be an unconstitutional encroachment on the supreme
court's authority to promulgate procedural rules. The staff of the Legis-
lative Council submitted a lengthy memorandum to the senator which
concluded:
[I]f a legal challenge is made regarding Section 1 of Senate
Bill No. 2301 and a claimed legislative encroachment on the
Supreme Court's constitutional right to promulgate procedural
rules, it is likely the court will determine the limitations in
Section 1 are procedural. A legislative statute governing judi-
cial procedure is not unconstitutional on its face. A procedural
statute is constitutional if the Supreme Court determines it does
not conflict with or engulf its rules.100
Subsection 3 of section 23-34-03, was part of a compromise
between the Board of Medical Examiners and the Commission on
Medical Competency, which sought relatively unrestricted access to peer
review records, and the North Dakota Medical Association and the North
Dakota Health Care Association, which considered confidentiality and
privilege an essential component of the peer review process. Another
compromise, as explained below, was the required reporting to the
Commission on Medical Competency.
100. Memorandum from the North Dakota Legislative Council Staff to Senator Lee (Mar. 14,
1997) (on file with the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW). Although this memorandum may not have the
same authority as an attorney general's opinion, the memorandum does reflect that the issue was
considered before the legislature acted on the legislation.
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C. LIMITATION ON LIABILITY
Senate Bill 2301 addressed the anxiety of persons participating in
the peer review process. A new section 23-34-06, states:
1. A person furnishing peer review records to a peer review
committee with respect to any patient examined or treated
by a health care provider 01 is not, by reason of furnishing
the records, liable in damages to any person or for willful
violation of a privileged communication.
2. A health care organization, 10 2 health care provider, or
member of a peer review committee is not liable in dam-
ages to any person for any action taken or recommenda-
tion made regarding a professional peer review, if the
organization, provider, or committee member acts without
malice and in the reasonable belief that the action or
recommendation is warranted by the facts known to the
organization, provider, or committee member.
D. MANDATORY REPORTING
The issue of required reports to the Commission on Medical
Competency remained a contentious issue through the legislative session,
and the interested parties did not agree on mutually acceptable legislative
language. Section 3 of Senate Bill 2301, which was supported by the
North Dakota Health Care Association and the North Dakota Medical
Association, amended section 43-17.1-05.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code by adding two sentences:
A physician who obtains information in the course of a
professional peer review pursuant to [chapter 23-34] is not
required to report pursuant to this section. A physician who
does not report information obtained in a professional peer
101. The term "health care provider" is broadly defined in § 23-34-01(2):
"Health care provider" means a physician or other person licensed, certified, or
otherwise authorized by the law of this state to provide health care services.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-01(2) (Supp. 1997).
102. The term "health care organization" includes many types of medical facilities. Section
23-34-01(1) states:
"Health care organization" means any hospital, hospital medical staff, clinic, long-term
or extended care facility, ambulatory surgery center, emergency medical services unit,
physician, group of physicians operating a clinic or outpatient care facility, combination
of these entities, or federally designated state peer review organization.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-34-01(1) (Supp. 1997).
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review is not subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability for
not making a report.
In addition, Senate Bill 2301 was amended in the Senate to include
a new section, now section 23-34-04:
A peer review committee shall report to the commission on
medical competency any information that indicates a probable
violation of subsection 4, 5, 16, or 17 of section 43-17-31.103
A health care organization is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if
its peer review committee fails to make any report required by
this section. 104
However, section 4 of House Bill 1135, which was introduced at the
request of the Board of Medical Examiners, extensively amended section
43-17.1-05.1:
Reports to commission on medical competency-When
required. A physician, thc state me---dical a ciatio andq itS
eempe.f:'te a physician assistant, or a fluoroscopy
technologist, a health care institution in the state, a state agency,
or a law enforcement agency in the state, or a cour4't in the Statc
having actual knowledge that a licensed physician, a physician
assistant, or a fluoroscopy technologist may be @m-edi!!!e ,
inoptent, guilty of unprefessi-n-Al eonduct, or mentally-eor
phys ically unable tc safe!), engage in the practiee Of mnedicn
have committed any of the grounds for disciplinary action
provided by law or by rules adopted by the board shall prompt-
ly report that information in writing to the commission. A
medical licensee or any institution from which the medical
licensee voluntarily resigns or voluntarily limits the licensee's
staff privileges shall report that licensee's action to the
commission if that action occurs while the licensee is under
103. Section 43-17-31 states in part:
Disciplinary action may be imposed against a physician upon any of the following
grounds:
4. Habitual use of alcohol or drugs.
5. Physical or mental disability materially affecting the ability to perform the duties
of a physician in a competent manner.
16. Sexual abuse, misconduct, or exploitation related to the licensee's practice of
medicine.
17. The prescription, sale, administration, distribution, or gift of any drug legally
classified as a controlled substance or as an addictive or dangerous drug for other than
medically accepted therapeutic purposes.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-31 (Supp. 1997).
104. 1997 N.D. LAWs 234.
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formal or informal investigation by the institution or a commit-
tee of the institution for any reason related to possible medical
incompetence, unprofessional conduct, or mental or physical
impairment. Upon receiving a report concerning a licensee the
commission shall, or on its own motion the commission may,
investigate any evidence that appears to show a licensee is or
may b medically i ....... , guilty Of ... unrfeSiOnal con
dzt, OF .... tly r phyi"ally incapablc of the prcper pfratzce
-eiein have committed any of the grounds for disci-
plinary action provided by law or by rules adopted by the
board. Any person required to report under this section who
makes a report in good faith may not be subject to criminal
prosecution or civil liability for making the report. For pur-
poses of any civil proceeding, the good faith of any person
who makes a report pursuant to this section is presumed. A
physician who obtains information in the course of a
physician-patient relationship in which the patient is another
physician is not required to report if the treating physician
successfully counsels the other physician to limit or withdraw
from practice to the extent required by the impairment. For
purposes of this section, a person has actual knowledge if that
person acquired the information by personal observation or
under circumstances that cause that person to believe there
exists a substantial likelihood that the information is correct.
Any agency or health care institution that violates this section
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. A physician, physician
assistant, or radiology technologist who violates this section is
subject to administrative action by the North Dakota state
board of medical examiners as specified by law or by
administrative rule.l0 5
The amendment of section 43-17.1-05.1 by Senate Bill 2301
(which became effective April 18, 1997, because it included an
emergency clause) and by House Bill 1135 (which became effective
August 1, 1997) created an interesting situation. Accordingly, the
Legislative Council attempted to reconcile the inconsistent amendments
for the code.106
105. 1997 N.D. LAW 373. House Bill 1135 was filed with the Secretary of State on April 2, 1997.
106. Section 1-02-09.1 states:
If amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same or different sessions of the
legislative assembly, one amendment without reference to another, the amendments are
to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given to each. If the amendments
are irreconcilable, the latest in date of enactment prevails.
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Section 43-17.1-05.1, as "harmonized" by the Legislative Council,
now states:
A physician, a physician assistant, or a fluoroscopy technolo-
gist, a health care institution in the state, a state agency, or a law
enforcement agency in the state having actual knowledge that a
licensed physician, a physician assistant, or a fluoroscopy
technologist may have committed any of the grounds for disci-
plinary action provided by law or by rules adopted by the
board shall promptly report that information in writing to the
commission. A medical licensee or any institution from which
the medical licensee voluntarily resigns or voluntarily limits the
licensee's staff privileges shall report that licensee's action to
the commission if that action occurs while the licensee is under
formal or informal investigation by the institution or a commit-
tee of the institution for any reason related to possible medical
incompetence, unprofessional conduct, or mental or physical
impairment. Upon receiving a report concerning a licensee the
commission shall, or on its own motion the commission may,
investigate any evidence that appears to show a licensee is or
may have committed any of the grounds for disciplinary action
provided by law or by rules adopted by the board. A person
required to report under this section who makes a report in
good faith is not subject to criminal prosecution or civil
liability for making the report. For purposes of any civil pro-
ceeding, the good faith of any person who makes a report
pursuant to this section is presumed. A physician who obtains
information in the course of a physician-patient relationship in
which the patient is another physician is not required to report
if the treating physician successfully counsels the other
physician to limit or withdraw from practice to the extent
required by the impairment. A physician who obtains infor-
mation in the course of a professional peer review pursuant to
chapter 23-34 is not required to report pursuant to this section.
A physician who does not report information obtained in a
professional peer review is not subject to criminal prosecution
or civil liability for not making a report. For purposes of this
section, a person has actual knowledge if that person acquired
the information by personal observation or under circum-
stances that cause that person to believe there exists a sub-
stantial likelihood that the information is correct. An agency
N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-09.1 (1987).
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or health care institution that violates this section is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor. A physician, physician assistant, or radi-
ology technologist who violates this section is subject to admini-
strative action by the North Dakota state board of medical
examiners as specified by law or by administrative rule.
E. RETROACTIVITY
Section 6 of Senate Bill 2301, as introduced, stated that "Section 1
of this Act applies retroactively to peer review records created before the
effective date of this Act." This provision triggered a controversy by
plaintiffs in then-existing actions who complained that the bill would
prevent their use of evidence obtained during discovery after the Trinity
Medical Center v. Holum decision. The House deleted the retroactivity
clause. 107
The retroactivity clause generated two legal memoranda. A
memorandum from the staff of the Legislative Council to a senator
analyzed this issue and concluded:
If a constitutional challenge is made regarding the retroactive
clause of the bill, the Supreme Court may determine it does not
result in a bill of attainder or create an ex post facto law. The
success of a challenge based on an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of an obligation of contract will depend on the contract
and the obligation claimed. The success of a claim that a
vested right has been taken without due process will depend on
whether the Supreme Court determines that Section 1 [chapter
23-34] is procedural, or whether a right to discovery or
evidentiary admission is based on an event that is uncertain.S08
A staff memorandum to the attorney general also addressed this
issue. The staff attorney concluded:
The medical peer review privilege in current law is expanded
under. . . Senate Bill 2301, both in terms of the committees
protected by the bill and the records of those committees that
are privileged. The bill does not interfere with the separation
of powers because the rules of evidence adopted by the
Supreme Court expressly authorize the creation of evidentiary
privileges by statute. Further, privileged material is not subject
107. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, FNrY-Fn'm SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY 957 (N.D. 1997).
108. Memorandum from the North Dakota Legislative Council Staff to Senator Lee (Mar. 14,
1997) (on file with the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW). Again, although this memorandum may not have
the same authority as an attorney general's opinion, the memorandum reflects that the issue was
addressed before the legislature acted on the bill.
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to the rules of discovery. The bill also will generally not be
applied retroactively and thus has no retroactivity problem,
except as applied to records that have previously been
disclosed, or to pending cases on the effective date of the act in
which material has already been introduced that is privileged
under the bill.109
Concerning the pending actions, the memorandum expressed
concern that "the retroactivity clause does raise constitutional questions
resulting from its application to cases in which the material has already
been introduced or to records that have already [been] disclosed."110
The memorandum suggested three options to avoid a constitutional
problem, and the bill was subsequently amended in accordance with the
suggestion. Section 6 of the bill was amended to state: "Section 1 of
this Act [chapter 23-34] does not apply in any action that was
commenced before the effective date of this Act."[l1
VII. CONCLUSION
Medical peer review in North Dakota was in disarray following
Trinity Medical Center v. Holum. However, as a result of Senate Bill
2301 and House Bill 1135, medical peer review should again be an
effective tool to continually improve the delivery of medical care, in the
state. The legislation balances a number of public policies including
confidentiality versus reports to the Commission on Medical Compe-
tency, prospective versus retroactive application of the law, and liability
of participants versus protection of persons who participate in good
faith. The legislation also prevents potential litigation by the Commis-
sion on Medical Competency concerning the Commission's access to
peer review records during an investigation of a physician. Although the
legislation may require "fine tuning" in subsequent legislative sessions,
chapters 23 through 34 of the North Dakota Century Code will be the
foundation for professional peer review into the 21st century.
109. Memorandum from Jim Fleming, Assistant Attorney General, to Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney
General (Mar. 24, 1997) (on file with the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW).
110. Id.
11. The definition of "peer review records" was concurrently amended to include the phrase
"regardless of when the record is created." JOURNAL OF THE SENATE HOUSE, FIFTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE 1203, 1221 (N.D. 1997); JOURNAL OF THE HousE, FIFrY-FIFm SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE
ASSEMBLY 1379, 1483 (N.D. 1997); 1997 N.D. LAWS 234.
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